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Case No. 20150564-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROGER BRYNER,
Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
V.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION,
Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AS APPELLANT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trial courts review challenged informal administrative proceedings by trial de
novo. Such trials de novo correct any procedural due process errors that might have
occurred. In this action, the trial judge failed to conduct a trial de novo. Instead he
reviewed the informal record and remanded this matter for the Division to correct a
notice that was deemed inadequate and to consider further evidence. The trial judge did
not have the authority to review the informal adjudicative proceeding other than by trial
de nova.
Bryner has failed to provide any legal argument to support his claim that the trial
~

judge was correct to review the informal record and rule upon whether the Division erred
1

instead of holding a trial de novo. The errors that Bryner claims were committed by the
Division in its informal proceeding, such as inadequate notice, are the same errors that
this Court has previously held are to be corrected through a trial de novo, not by a review
of the agency proceeding.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY NOT HOLDING A TRIAL DE
NOVO AS REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW

Bryner had his driver's license suspended by an informal administrative
proceeding. Bryner filed his petition for judicial review with the trial court. J_udicial
review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is done by trial de novo. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-4-402(l)(a) (West Supp. 2015) ("The district courts have jurisdiction to review by

trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings").
The trial judge erred by not conducting a trial de novo.
Bryner argues, without citation to authority, that no trial de novo was needed
because the trial judge was able to summarily determine that the notice given in the
informal proceeding was defective and that erroneous facts were relied upon as well.
Opening Brief of Petitioner at 18.1 This is contrary to this Court's previous decisions.
An alleged defect in the notice does not excuse the court from following the
statutory required review process. Indeed, the absolute right to a trial de novo before the

1

The only copy of this brief received by the Division was a pdf without numbered pages.
To make Bryner's tables of contents and authorities match the brief, the Division has
begun its numbering of the brief with the cover as page one.
2

trial court is meant to correct any such errors. Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 190 P .2d
587, 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (allegedly defective notice in the informal proceeding was
cured by trial de novo in the district court). In Brinkerhoff, the notice of the hearing
received by the petitioner did not state that the administrative proceeding would be
informal. The trial court reversed the agency's decision on the basis of the defective
notice and remanded the matter to the agency. Reversing the trial court, this Court held
that the absolute right to a trial de novo meant that the petitioner could not suffer any
prejudice.
Claims of factual problems in the administrative proceedings are also cured by a
trial de· novo, not by a remand to the agency for a new hearing. In Cordova v. Blackstock,
861 P.2d 449 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court held that a claim that the residuum rule
had been violated was to be reviewed by trial de novo and not by reviewing the informal
proceeding's record.
This provision requires that the district court's review of informal
adjudicative proceedings be accomplished by holding a new trial, not just
by reviewing an informal record. UAPA's statutory scheme ensures that
"each applicant has the opportunity to have a formal hearing before the
agency, or a [trial] de novo review by the district court." One reason for
this statutory scheme is that appellate courts need a complete record in
order to review adjudication.
Id. at 451 (citations omitted).

The Utah Supreme Court has expressly approved of this Court's decisions in
Cordova and Brinkerhoff.

3

[W]e note with approval and adopt the rule previously used in two
decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals es~ablishing the right to a new
trial without deference to the determinations of an informal administrative
proceeding. This rule guarantees the district court the opportunity to
correct any deficiencies that may arise because of the informal nature of
administrative proceedings and provides an adequate record for future
review.

Archer v. Bd. ofState Lands and Forestry, 901 P.2d 1142, 1144-45 (Utah 1995) (citations
omitted).
This Court's recent decision in Christensen v. Rolfe, 2014 UT App 223, 336 P.3d
40 (informal driver's license proceedings are only reviewed by trial de novo and not by
review of the administrative proceeding), was also presented to the trial court. R. 460,
541,681, 706. In Christensen, this Court again affirmed that informal administrative
proceedings are reviewed only by trial de novo and not by a review of the record of the
informal proceeding. 2014 UT App 223, ~ 1.

CONCLUSION
The trial judge should have reviewed the challenged informal administrative
proceeding by trial de novo. Instead, he reviewed the informal proceeding's record and
remanded for the Division to correct errors perceived by the trial judge. The trial court's
decision should be reversed and this case should be remanded to the trial court for trial de
novo.

4

Case No. 20150564-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROGER BRYNER,
Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
V.

UTAH DEPARTivffiNT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION,
Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

RESPONSE BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AS CROSS-APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code
Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2015).

STATEMENTS OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Though warned several times by this Court, Roger Bryner has again used
offensive, inappropriate, and disrespectful material in his opening brief. Should Bryner' s
~

opening brief be stricken and this Court refuse to reach the merits of his cross-appeal?
Issue Preserved Below and Standard of Review: This issue is unique to the appeal
and does not require the review of the trial court's decision.
5

2. Instead of conducting a trial de novo, the trial judge ruled upon his review of
the informal proceeding's record and remanded this action to the Division to conduct a
new informal hearing. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review a trial court order
remanding an action to the agency?
Issue Preserved Below and Standard of Review: This issue is unique to the appeal
and does not require the review of the trial court's decision.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
There is no determinative statute relevant to Bryner' s cross-appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Roger Bryner filed this petition for judicial review of an informal administrative
proceeding in which his driver•s license was suspended. R. 227-35.
Instead of holding a trial de novo, the trial judge reviewed the informal
administrative proceeding. The judge held that he had insufficient information as to what
evidence was presented in the informal proceeding. R. 586-87. The trial judge therefore
remanded this action for the Division to consider further evidence in a new informal
proceeding. R. 5 87. The trial judge also remanded this action to the Division to give
Bryner new notice in lieu of the administrative notice the trial judge held to be
inadequate. R. 586-87.
The Court rejects the Division's position that the Court should either
substitute its own judgment for the Division's exercise of discretion or defer
to the Division's decision when it is unclear the Division exercised its
6

discretion with the actual facts before it. The statute plainly grants the
Division discretion, but the parties' factual submissions do not indicate that
the Division even knew of a warrant, as opposed to a citation, being issued
against Petitioner. In such case, the alternative remedy of remand is
appropriate.
After reviewing the briefs and arguments and evidence submitted in
this proceeding, the Court finds the evidence is insufficient to determine
whether the Division was notified by a Court of and considered the
existence of an outstanding warrant against the Petitioner, as required under
Utah Code§ 53-3-221(3)(a). The submissions of the parties here indicate
that Petitioner was informed of an outstanding citation, as opposed to the
existence of a warrant. Properly framing the issue by notice is important
for two reasons: First, it informs the Petitioner of the actual basis for the
proposed administrative action, and second, it ensures that the Division
made its decision based on the actual facts that potentially justify its action.
R. 586-87.
The trial court entered its final order on June 18, 2015. R. 5 85-87. The Division
timely filed its notice of appeal on June 29, 2015. R. 590-92. Bryner filed a postjudgment motion on June 30, 2015, R. 595-99, that was denied by the trial court on
August 13, 2015. R. 640-41. Bryner filed his cross notice of appeal on September 4,
2015 . R. 643. The Division filed its amended notice of appeal on September 9, 2015. R.
651-52.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The following quotes from Bryner's opening brief are the only facts relevant to the
issues raised in the Division' s response brief.
Additionally I believe the Court of Appeals in Mike's Smoke, Cigar &
Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 Utah App. 158 (hereinafter Mike's Case)
was incorrect in it' s ruling, ignoring supreme court legal precedent, and
simply ruled the way it did because Mormons from the state government of
7

Utah were requesting the relief, much as Mormons from the state
government of Utah are requesting relief now, and different standards are
applied by the Mormon judges of the Court of appeals to grant relief to
those they favor over those they do not favor. Because I do not believe that
a honest opinion will be forthcoming, I am including arguments that discuss
the merits of the decision and constitutional issues.
Statement of issues on appeal
1) The ruling in Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City,

2015 Utah App. 15 8 is wrong and contrary to the weight of prior
controlling legal precedent from the Utah Supreme Court, and a part of a
clear pattern of the Court of Appeals ignoring that law to grant relief to
favored appellants by way of unequal application of the law.
Bryner' s opening brief at 5

I agree that the court of appeals simply got it wrong in Mike's case,
and reviewed a nonfinal order to push a decidedly mormon agenda through
the courts, and entirely inconsistent with the prior case law on the mater
[sic].
Id. at 12.
Nobody but Roger Bryner will have ever had his license suspended
by the Court of Appeals in the State of Utah in a memorandum decision. If
that does not demonstrate bias, and a written and specific intent by the same
body to discriminate against the specific in_dividual for over a decade, what
does? See 2006 UT App 398 "special leniency on the basis of prose status
is manifestly inappropriate." This is in fact a thinly veiled but explicit
message from the Court of appeals to discard the protections of the 14th
amendment of the US constitution for the disfavored party. There is nothing
especially bad or wrong about my filings, in fact everything I submit is in
general exceptional even for attorneys and I have a higher success ratio
than most attorneys, and only the political opinions and agenda of the all
mormon court of appeals is really at issue. No decision against the
Mormons in state government will be forthcoming as long as a disfavored
litigant who has been marked, by official opinion, for higher levels of
scrutiny than those applied to Mormon attorneys.

Id. at 19.

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Though previously warned by this Court, Bryner has once again inserted material
in his brief that is patently offensive and disrespectful to this Court. Bryner has been
warned about this behavior, and has been sanctioned for it. This Court should strike
Bryner's opening brief and decline to reach the merits of his cross-appeal.
This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from the district court's review of
i!lfonnal administrative proceedings. This Court has already held that the district court
court's order is an appealable final decision even when it remanded the action back to the
v;j

agency.

ARGUMENT

I. BRYNER'S OPENING BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN
BECAUSE IT CONTAINS STATEMENTS THAT ARE OFFENSIVE
AND DISRESPECTFUL TO THIS COURT
A pleading that contains material that is "offensive, inappropriate, and
vd

disrespectful" constitutes a violation of rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. See Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Assoc., 2007 UT 2, 112, 151 P.3d
962 (striking briefs on appeal due to inappropriate content). This Court has previously
.placed Bryner on notice that it would not tolerate his further use of offensive and
disrespectful statements about the courts of Utah. This notice was given as early as 2006
in Bryner v. Lindberg, 2006 UT App U398.
We place Petitioner on notice that he will not be afforded leniency based
upon his prose status in the application of the procedural rules.
Specifically, pleadings containing inappropriate content ... or pleadings
9

that appear calculated to harass any party, their counsel, or the court, will
be stricken and will result in imposition of other sanctions, as allowed
under rules 40 and 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Id. at *3 (attached as Addendum A) .
. This Court further warned Bryner in its Order entered April 10, 2008 in

Bryner v. Lindberg; Case No. 20080065-CA. 2
Bryner is hereby placed on notice that any future filings that are frivolous
or contain ( 1) statements constituting personal attacks on the integrity of the Utah
courts or judges; (2) burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous material; or
(3) statements intended to harass the court, any party, or counsel participating in
the case are prohibited, shall be stricken, and/or shall result in the imposition of
sanctions under rules 3 3 and 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A
violation of this order shall be contempt, and shall be punished as this court deems
appropriate. See Utah R. App. P. 40(c) ("This rule shall not be construed to limit
or impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers.").

Id. at 3 (attached as Addendum B)
This Court also ordered that:
Bryner's future filings in this court shall not be frivolous and shall
not include statements that (I) constitute personal attacks on the integrity of
Utah courts or judges, ... ; (2) are "burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or
scandalous", ... ; or (3) are intended to harass the court, any party, or any
counsel participating in the case. The filing of any documents, motions, or
pleadings of any kind containing such objectionable content shall be
actionable as contempt, shall be- stricken, and shall be sanctioned as this
court deems appropriate.

Id. (citations omitted).
Shortly after this Court entered this Order, it was forced to use it against Bryner.
In Bryner v. Bryner, Case No. 20070811, 2008 WL 2544897 (Utah Ct. App. 2008)

2

An undated copy of this Order was obtained by counsel for the Division from this
Court's Clerks' Office.
10

(attached as Addendum C), this Court struck Bryner's brief and declined to reach the
merits of his appeal because of his violations of the April 10, 2008 Order and rule 24(k)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
More recently, this Court reminded Bryner that "the issuance of an arrest warrant
was the result ofBryner's own conduct in another case and was not, as he now claims, a
part of an alleged conspiracy involving court personnel.to deny his access to the court."

Bryner v. Custodian ofRecords, 2016 UT App 40, 18 (attached as Addendum D).
Bryner's opening brief violates this Court's prior orders and rule 24. Bryner
VP

repeatedly accuses this Court of ruling not on the merits of appeals, but in favor of certain
parties due to their religion. Opening Brief of Petitioner at 5, 12, 19 (this material is
quoted at length in the Statement of Relevant Facts). Bryner also accuses this Court of
discriminating personally against-him for over a decade. Id. at 19.
The Division· urges this Court to review the cited statements made by Bryner in his
brief and determine if they violate this Court's prior warnings and orders. If this Court
finds that they do, Bryner' s brief should be stricken and this Court should decline to
reach the merits of his cross-appeal.

II. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINAL ORDER EVEN THOUGH IT REMANDED THIS
MATTER TO THE DIVISION
Bryner' s argument that this Court is without jurisdiction is based on his claim that

Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 UT App 158,353 P.3d 626, was
wrongly decided. Opening Brief of Petitioner at 5, 8-14. Bryner's argument is that the
11

trial judge did not enter a final order because he remanded this matter to the Division to
hold a new hearing rather than conduct de novo review. But this Court, following the
Utah Supreme Court's precedent, has already held that an order remanding a petition for
judicial review back to the administrative agency is a final order because it ended the
controversy between the parties in the district court. Mike's Smoke, 2015 UT App 158,
1110-11.
This Court reached this decision following the Utah Supreme Court's decision in

Zions Management Services v. Record, 2013 UT 36,305 P.3d 1062. Zions involved an
appeal from a trial court's order remanding the action back to the administrative body to
conduct arbitration. The Supreme Court held that remand was a final appealable order
because it left nothing more to be done in the trial court. Id., 126.
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The trial court remanded this
action to the Division to hold a new hearing. R. 587. Nor does the language in the trial
court's ruling on Bryner's post-judgment motion, "[t]hat Order contemplates no further
action by this Court until the agency completes this action" (R. 640), change the result. It
is similar to the statement by the trial court in Mike's Smoke 3 that this Court held did not
alter the appealed from order into a non-final order. 2015 UT App 158, 112.
While Bryner argues that Mike's Smoke was wrongly decided, he fails to argue
why this Court should ignore stare decisis and consider reversing its prior decision. This
Court is bound to follow the holding of Mike's Smoke because horizontal stare decisis
3

"until after the City [Council] holds an evidentiary hearing."
12

requires that an earlier decision by the same court govern later decisions. State v. Becker,
2015 UT App 304,110,365 P.3d 173. "Although we have authority to overrule our own
precedent in some limited circumstances, we will ' not do so lightly' - the challenged
decision must be (1) 'clearly e1Toneous' or (2) 'conditions [must] have changed so as to
render the prior decision inapplicable.'" Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 21 1, 1 44, 33 5
P.3d 378. The decision in Mike's Smoke is not clearly erroneous. Nor have conditions
changed since last year when the decision was made.
This Coui1 has jurisdiction to consider the Division's appeal.

CONCLUSION
Bryner' s opening brief should be stricken as a sanction for his use of patently
offensive and disrespectful statements concerning this Cami. Further, this Court has
jurisdiction to hear the Division's appeal from the trial court's order.
Respectfully submitted this

;'

>ti day of May, 2016.

~PL~

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Solicitor General
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
Cross-Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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Roger Bryner
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ADDENDUM "A"

Bryner v. Lindberg, Not Reported in P.3d (2006)
2006 UT App 398

2006 WL 2779855
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES
BEFORE CITING.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Roger BRYNER, Petitioner,

v.
Honorable Judge Denise P. LINDBERG and Lana
Bryner, Respondents.
Nos. 20060754-CA, 20060814-CA.

I

Sept. 28, 2006.

I

Certiorari Denied Feb. 12, 2007.
Original Proceeding in this Court.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Roger Bryner, Midvale, Petitioner Pro Se.
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Respondent
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg.
Before Judges DAVIS, McHUGH, and ORME.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PERCURIAM:

*1 Petitioner Roger Bryner filed two petitions seeking
extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus.
The petition in case no. 20060754-CA essentially
challenges restrictions imposed by the district court in
managing the cases between Roger Bryner and Lana
Bryner. Petitioner challenges a restriction placed on both
parties requiring that only a single motion from each party
can be pending at any time. He also challenges
restrictions on using standby counsel. While that petition
was pending, Petitioner filed a second petition, case no.
20060814-CA, also seeking extraordinary relief against
Judge Lindberg. In the interest of judicial economy, we
address both petitions.
· WE"STl.A\N

@

In an order dated April 20, 2006, the district court ruled:
The Court enjoins each side from
filing more than one motion at a
time. No additional motions may be
filed by that side until the other
side has had an opportunity to
answer. The movant may then reply
to the opposition, and file a notice
to submit. The matter will then be
submitted for decision. Once the
Court has had the opportunity to
rule on the pending motion, that
party will then be free to file other
motions.
By
imposing this
limitation the Court does not intend
to interfere with the parties'
constitutional rights. Rather, the
Court is exercising its inherent
authority to manage its caseload in
the most effective and efficient
way, in order to ensure that all
matters that the parties wish to
bring for action by the Court can be
attended to in a thorough and
orderly manner.

In a June 20, 2006 minute entry, the district court
reiterated that "the filing restrictions were designed to
strike a balance between the parties' constitutional right to
seek redress from the courts and the Court's need to
manage its caseload appropriately."
In an August 10, 2006 order, the court stated its position
that, in appearances before the court, Petitioner "must
elect whether to appear pro se or be represented by
counsel." Although noting that Petitioner could "freely
consult with anyone of his choosing outside the
courtroom," the court stated that if he wished to receive
assistance of counsel in the court, "counsel must enter his
appearance and then counsel (not the petitioner) will be
the only one who will be allowed to file Motions, to make
argument to the Court, or to conduct any presentation or
cross-examination of proffered evidence."
In the petition filed as case no. 20060754-CA, Petitioner
requests an order (1) requiring Judge Lindberg to allow an
attorney to sit silently by him and pass notes, (2)
declaring the filing restrictions unconstitutional, and (3)
remanding all issues regarding child custody to the
commissioner, rather than to the district court judge. The
claim that the district court cannot determine child
custody issues is without merit, and we do not consider it

201 c, Thomson Reute(s. Ne cla,rn to original U.S. Government Works.

Bryner v. Lindberg, Not Reported in P.3d (2006)

2006 UT App 398

further.

standby counsel in the civil without merit.

"Extraordinary relief may be granted if ... the petitioner
can establish that a lower court 'exceeded its jurisdiction
or abused its discretion.' " Burke v. Lewis, 2005 UT 44,~
9, 122 P.3d 533 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (d)(2)(A));
see also State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah
Ct.App.1998) (holding that abuse of discretion for
purposes of extraordinary writs must be more blatant
"than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in
routine appellate review"). "Where the challenged
proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's review shall
not extend further than to determine whether the
respondent has regularly pursued its authority." Utah R.
Civ. P. 65B(d)(4).

The petition seeking extraordinary relief in case no.
20060814-CA duplicates some claims from the petition in
case no. 20060754-CA. The second petition also seeks
relief from the district court's order denying
cross-motions to enforce the settlement agreement, which
is the subject of the appeal pending as case no.
20060214-CA. In addition, the petition contains patently
offensive and disrespectful statements regarding the
district court judge.

*2 The district court did not abuse its discretion in
adopting the filing restrictions. The court imposed
reasonable restrictfons on both parties by precluding the
filing of multiple motions until a previous motion filed by
the same party was resolved. Petitioner's contention that
the court did not apply the restriction to both parties is
frivolous. The opposing parties' request for hearing on a
pending motion does not constitute the filing of a multiple
motion in violation of the filing restriction. Under the
circumstances, the district court's restrictions are
reasonable and do not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Petitioner's claim that he has been denied the
constitutional right to counsel of his choice is unsupported
and without merit. The case law he cites concerns the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel extended to criminal
defendants. Both proceedings in which Petitioner is
involved are civil proceedings, and the cited authorities
are not pertinent. Nevertheless, the discussion in United
States v. Gonzales-Lopez, --- U.S. ----, 126 S.Ct. 2557,
165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), cited by Petitioner, is illustrative
of the discretion that a court possesses governing
representation by counsel, even in a criminal case. The
majority opinion acknowledged the "trial court's wide
latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against
the needs of fairness, and against the demands of its
calendar." The supreme court also acknowledged the trial
court's "inherent power to enforce rules or adhere to
practices that determine which attorneys may appear
before it, or to make scheduling and other decisions that
effectively exclude a defendant's first choice of counsel."
Id. at 2565-66.
The district court did not restrict Petitioner from either
representation the courtroom. district court constitutional
proceedings is by counsel or consultation with counsel
outside Under the circumstances, the claim that the
abused its discretion or violated a purported right to have
WESTLAv\'

Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides an equivalent to rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and requires a party to sign all filings as a
certification that they are not frivolous or interposed for
purposes of delay. Bryner states in the second petition:
I further certify that to the best of
my knowledge, information and
belief the statements contained
therein are true, however, I am not
a lawyer and no reasonable
unbiased judge could presume to
hold me to the same standard of
knowledge of law that an attorney
would be held to.

*3 On the contrary, rule 40(b) states, in part:
The court may, after reasonable
notice and an opportunity to show
cause to the contrary, and upon
hearing,
if
requested,
take
appropriate action against any
attorney or person who practices
before
it
for
inadequate
representation of a client, conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar
or a person allowed to appear
before the court, or for failure to
comply with these rules or order of
the court.

Utah R.App. P. 40(b).
In addition, because Bryner "avails [himself] of the
judicial machinery as a matter of routine, special leniency
on the basis of pro se status is manifestly inappropriate."
Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11,, 4, 67 P.3d 1000. "This is
particularly true where the filings in question are routinely
frivolous and have been brought with the apparent
purpose, or at least effect, of harassment, not only of
opposing parties, but of the judicial machinery itself." Id.
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Bryner v. Lindberg, Not Reported in P.3d (2006)

2006 UT App 398

------------·-------------------

at 1 5. "The courts of this state possess the powers
necessary to maintain the orderly disposition of matters
brought before them, including the power to levy
sanctions and, in appropriate cases, to hold in contempt
the parties who appear before them." Id at 'if 15.
The petition filed in case no. 20060814-CA duplicates
requests for relief contained in the previous appeals and in
the first petition seeking extraordinary relief. In addition,
the second petition contains statements that are patently
offensive and disrespectful of the district court. We place
Petitioner on notice that he will not be afforded leniency
based upon his pro se status in the application of the
procedural rules. Specifically, pleadings containing
inappropriate content or dup Heating claims in prior or
pending proceedings, or pleadings that appear calculated
End of Document
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to harass any party, their counsel, or the court, will be
stricken and will result in imposition of other sanctions, as
allowed under rules 40 and 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Utah R.App. P. 33; 40.
We deny both petitions seeking extraordinary relief in
case nos. 20060754-CA and 20060814-CA.

All Citations
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 2779855, 2006 UT App
398
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ADDENDUM "B"

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
----00000----

Roger Bryner,

)

ORDER

)

Petitioner,

)

Case No. 20080065-CA

}

v.

)

Judge Denise P. Lindberg
and Judge William Barrett,

)

)

Respondents.

)
)

)

Before Judges Greenwood, McHugh, and Orme.
Pursuant to rule 33(c) (2} of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Petitioner Roger Bryner was ordered to appear and show
cause why damages should not be awarded to Respondents based upon
Petitioner's filing of a frivolous petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
"[A] frivolous appeal, motion, brief or other paper is
one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law,
or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33(b}. Damages may
include single or double costs and/or reasonable attorney fees.
See id. R. 33(c) (2).
Under rule 33, a frivolous appeal or
proceeding is one that has "no reasonable legal or factual
basis." O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
An appellate court considering imposition of sanctions is not
required to find subjective bad faith before sanctions can be
awarded under rule 33. See id.
This court determined that the
petition for writ of habeas corpus was frivolous because it was
without a basis in law or fact.
See Bryner v. Hon. Lindberg and
Barrett, 2008 UT App 53.
Furthermore, Bryner's argument at the
order to show cause hearing that he thought his petition was well
taken does not insulate him from paying damages. Consequently,
this court could assess damages against Bryner pursuant to rule
33.
Despite this conclusion, this court exercises its discretion
and chooses not to impose an award of damages under rule 33 in
this instance.
We caution Bryner, however, to take care with future
filings, both in terms of the proper use of the motions and

remedies afforded by the rules and in terms of the content of
those documents.
Bryner's memorandum, dated March 10, 2008,
demonstrates the basis for our concern about inappropriate
content in his filings.
Indeed, we have previously admonished
Bryner about such conduct.
See Bryner v. Hon. Lindberg, 2006 UT
App 398 (advising Bryner that inappropriate pleadings may be
stricken or result in imposition of sanctions). That memorandum
contains material that is "offensive, inappropriate, and
disrespectful" and constitutes a violation of rule 24(k) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
See Peters v. Pine Meadow
Ranch Home Assoc., 2007 UT 2, ~ 12, 151 P.3d 962 (striking briefs
on appeal due to inappropriate content). The memorandum includes
material that personally attacks the integrity of Utah courts and
judges, rather than challenging claims of alleged legal or
factual error.
See id. at i i 7 & 15. We note the following
instances of objectionable content:
1. The statement on pages one and two to the effect
that no Utah court will declare the Utah Standards of
Professionalism and Civility unconstitutional "due to
the fact that they ultimately report to the Utah
Supreme Court, and thus are biased."
2.
The statement on page two that Utuh trial court
judges "routinely use[] court proceedings which males
have brought against females to punish the males
without due process and without jurisdiction."
3. The statement on page three attributed to an
attorney, but not containing a direct quotation, that
the trial judge's court "was so unconstitutional and
biased as to be impossible to achieve any level of
fairness in" and that "literally dozens of attorneys
have expressed the same thoughts regarding [the trial
judge] in regards to this case."
4.
The statement on page four that two district court
judges have "conspired" to limit his ability to
criticize those judges in connection with retention
elections by entering orders that require him to comply
with standards of civility and professionalism.

2

5.
The statement on page four that "[w]hile [the] Pine
Meadows [case] has established the precedent that
disagreement and telling the truth about the courts can
lead to violations of due process and punishing the
'boy who said the emperor had no clothes' I disagree
and am seeking to void the rules of professionalism and
civility which led to these very bad decisions of law
by taking my case to federal court . . . . "
Bryner is hereby placed on notice that any future filings
that are frivolous or contain (1) statements constituting
personal attacks on the integrity of the Utah courts or judges;
(2) burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous material; or
(3) statements intended to harass the court, any party, or
counsel participating in the case are prohibited, shall be
stricken, and/or shall result in the imposition of sanctions
under rules 33 and 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
A violation of this order shall be contempt, and shall be
punished as this court deems appropriate.
See Utah R. App. P.
40 (c) ( "This rule shall not be construed to limit or impair the
court's inherent and statutory contempt powers.")
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the order to show cause, dated
February 22, 2008, is withdrawn and no damages are imposed at
this time.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bryner's future filings in this
court shall not be frivolous and shall not include statements
that (1) constitute personal attacks on the integrity of Utah
courts or judges,~ Peters, 2007 UT 2 at~~ 7 & 15; (2) are
"burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous", see Utah R.
App. P. 24(k); or (3) are intended to harass the court, any
party, or any counsel participating in the case, see Bryner v.
Hon. Lindberg, 2006 UT App 398.
The filing of any documents,
motions, or pleadings of any kind containing such objectionable
content shall be actionable as contempt, shall be stricken, and
shall be sanctioned as this court deems appropriate.
Dated this _ _ day of April, 2008.
FOR THE COURT
3

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge
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ADDENDUM "C"

Bryner v. Bryner, Not Reported in P.3d (2008)
2008 WL 2544897

2008 WL 2544897
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES
BEFORE CITING.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Roger BRYNER, Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
Lana BRYNER, Respondent and Appellee.
No. 20070811-CA.

I

June 26, 2008.
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 044904183; The
Honorable William W. Barrett.

Attorneys and Law Firms
Roger Bryner, Midvale, Appellant Pro Se.
Emily B. Smoak and Thomas J. Bums, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.

*1 Roger Bryner appeals the trial court's contempt order
and judgment entered on September 25, 2007. This matter
is before the court on its own motion to strike Mr.
Bryner's brief.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that an appellate court
is not required to address the merits of an appeal if an
appellant's brief contains unfounded accusations
impugning the integrity of the court. See Peters v. Pine
Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007 UT 2, ,I 1, 151 P.3d
962. In these situations, the brief may be stricken and the
appellate court may decline to consider the appeal as a
sanction for violations of rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. See id ~ 23.
In this court's April 10, 2008 Order, Mr. Bryner was
specifically ordered that his future filings must not
contain frivolous content or include any statements that:
( 1) constitute an attack on the integrity of Utah courts or
judges, see id ~~ 1, 15; (2) are burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial, or scandalous, see Utah R.App. P. 24(k); or
(3) are intended to harass the court, any party, or any
counsel participating in the case. 1 Based on the violations
of this court's Order and rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, we strike Mr. Bryner's brief and
decline to reach the merits of his appeal. See Peters, 2007
UT2, ~23.

Before Judges BENCH, BILLINGS, and McHUGH.
Accordingly, the trial court's order and judgment are
affirmed.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)

All Citations
Not Reported in P.3d, 2008 WL 2544897

PERCURIAM:

Footnotes
Mr. Bryner was previously admonished that his filings would be stricken if they contained inappropriate content. See
Bryner v. Hon. Lindberg, 2006 UT App 398U, paras. 6-8 (mem.) (per curiam).

End of Document
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ADDENDUM "D"

Bryner v. Custodian of Records,-· P.3d •••• (2016)
2016 UT App 40

,I 3 In September 2014, Bryner filed the civil complaint in
2016 WL 869057
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED
FOR
PUBLICATION
IN
THE
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. ,

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Roger BRYNER, Appellant,
v.
CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS, Appellee.
No. 20150685-CA.

I

March 3, 2016.
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department,
140906706; The Honorable Vernice S. Trease.

,I 4 On April 30, 2015, Bryner filed a "motion to
No.

Attorneys and Law Firms
Roger Bryner, Appellant Pro Se.
Todd J. Godfrey and Bradley W. Christopherson, for
Appellee.
Before Judges J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., STEPHEN L.
ROTH, and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN.

Decision
PERCURIAM:

*1 ,r 1 Roger Bryner appeals the dismissal of his civil case
against the custodian of records for the Holladay Justice
Court. We affirm.

,r

2 Bryner was a defendant in a traffic case in the
Holladay Justice Court. He filed a request under the
Government Records Access and Management Act
(GRAMA), seeking documents from his own case as well
as sentencing documents in cases involving other persons
who had been charged with the same offenses. He
pursued appeals from the denial of his ORAMA request.
Ultimately, the Management Committee of the Utah
Judicial Council issued an order that granted Bryner's
appeal in part and denied it in part.
WESTLP.W
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this case, claiming that the Holladay Justice Court did not
comply with the Management Committee's order. On
April 13, 2015, the district court held a motion hearing at
which Bryner was allowed to appear by telephone. The
district court stated that Bryner must appear in court in
person for future proceedings. The district court set a trial
date for June 8, 2015. The court reset the motion hearing
for April 27, 2015, and also ordered the parties to be
present on that date to engage in face-to-face discussions
in an effort to resolve the case. Bryner requested that this
discussion take place by telephone, which the court
denied. Bryner did not appear on April 27, 2015, and the
court denied his pending motion for summary judgment.

designate defendant" in which he sought to amend his
complaint to name the court clerk of the Holladay Justice
Court as a defendant. On May 5, 2015, Bryner filed a
motion to issue a subpoena to the court clerk or "declare it
unnecessary." In separate May 28, 2015 orders, the
district court denied the motion to amend the complaint to
add a new defendant and granted the motion to issue a
subpoena directed to the court clerk, stating that Bryner
was responsible for service of the subpoena. On the same
day, the district court issued a subpoena.
~

5 On June 4, 2015, Bryner moved to reschedule the June

8 trial, stating that he was Hunable to afford to serve
process," and the district court "refused to waive fees for
service of process." He also stated that he could not afford
to travel to Salt Lake City for trial on his civil complaint
and that he could not personally appear in the district
court because he was subject to arrest on an outstanding
warrant from the Holladay Justice Court. Bryner failed to
appear for trial. Opposing counsel appeared, along with
the court clerk of the Holladay Justice Court. The district
court dismissed the case as a consequence of Bryner' s
failure to appear. Noting opposing counsel's objection to
a continuance, the district court stated,
This court makes a record that the
subpoena was issued regarding the
witness he was concerned he would
not be able to subpoena. That
witness is present and Mr. Bryner
would have been able to hear her
testimony on this date. The Court
makes a record of Mr. Bryner's
concern for an outstanding warrant
out of Holladay Justice Court. The
Court rules that is not a basis for
him not to appear in Court. The
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Court denies Mr. Bryner's motion
to continue this trial and moves
forward. Based on Mr. Bryner's
failure to appear and failure to put
on evidence, with [the court clerk]
present, the Court dismisses this
case with prejudice. Additionally
the court renders the pending
motions [moot]. The Court denies
Mr. Bryner'.s motion for a
telephone conference.
*2 ,r 6 "In reviewing a trial court's decision to dismiss for
failure to prosecute, we accord the trial court broad
discretion and do not disturb its decision absent an abuse
of discretion and a likelihood that an injustice has
occurred." Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694,
697 (Utah Ct.App.1994). "In determining whether the
court abused its discretion, we 'balance the need to
expedite litigation and efficiently utilize judicial resources
with the need to allow parties to have their day in court.' "
Id. (citing Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ .•
813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). In analyzing
whether a trial court has abused its discretion in
dismissing a case for failure to prosecute, we consider (1)
the conduct of both parties, (2) the opportunity each party
has to move the case forward, (3) what each party has
done to move the case forward, (4) the amount of
difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the
other side, and (5) whether injustice may result from the
dismissal. Cheek v. Clay Bulloch Constr., Inc., 2011 UT
App 418, ,r 1,269 P.3d 964. In performing this review, we
consider that "the plaintiff, as the party initiating the
lawsuit, has the primary responsibility to move the case
forward" and that the defendant has no general
responsibility to move plaintiffs case forward. See
Hartford leasing, 888 P.2d at 698 n. 2.

,I 7 Because Bryner did not appear at the trial to present
evidence in support of his claims that the Holladay Justice
Court violated the Management Committee's order, those
claims are not preserved for appeal. 1 The only issue
before this court is whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying his belated requests to continue the
trial and hold a further telephone scheduling conference
and in dismissing his civil case for failure to appear at
trial. Bryner had ample notice of the trial date in his civil
case. The court denied his motion to join the court clerk

as a defendant. The court granted Bryner's alternative
motion to issue a subpoena to compel the clerk's
appearance at trial, clarifying that Bryner was responsible
for service. Four days before the scheduled trial, Bryner
moved to continue the trial and hold a scheduling
conference because he claimed he could not afford to
serve the subpoena, could not afford transportation to
court, and was subject to arrest on an outstanding warrant
if he appeared in court. None of these circumstances
excused Bryner from his primary responsibility to move
his civil case forward. Contrary to his argument, rule
4-502 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration,
which pertained to discovery disputes, did not require the
district court to hold a further conference in this case.
~

8 Bryner argues that he was misled by the district court
and the opposing party because he was not informed that
the Holladay Justice Court clerk would be available at
trial. At his request, the district court issued a subpoena to
compel the attendance of a witness. Although he failed to
serve the subpoena, the witness was present at trial. As
the plaintiff in this civil case, Bryner had the primary
responsibility to move the case forward. It was not the
responsibility of the district court or the opposing party to
prosecute Bryner's case or assure that it moved forward.
Bryner was aware of the trial date. Bryner did not appear
in person in court for any hearing in the civil case that he
initiated, even when he was specifically required by the
district court to do so. By failing to appear, he clearly
risked the possibility that the case would be dismissed.
Furthermore, the issuance of an arrest warrant was the
result of Bryner's own conduct in another case and was
not, as he now claims, a part of an alleged conspiracy
involving court personnel to deny his access to the court.
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying a continuance or the request for a scheduling
conference and in dismissing the case.
*3 ~ 9 We affirm the district court's dismissal of the
underlying case with prejudice.

All Citations
--- P.3d ----, 2016 WL 869057, 2016 UT App 40

Footnotes
Bryner attempts to raise a jurisdictional issue by alleging that the district court lacked authority to review the
Management Committee's order. Because Bryner filed the underlying case seeking to enforce the Management
Committee's order, which necessarily involved review of its requirements, this assertion lacks merit.
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